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"MISSION TO MOSCOW n
By KLAUS MEHrERI'
Not long Uf/O tL't. received tlte book "Jli8sion to Jr08cow" by J08cph E. Daviu,
11 duutJes parlicuWr allelltiOlt, first oj all becclUilG i/ll au/l,or iii <1"'011(/ tile leadill:1
A //Iuiccl/I polit'ici.fHl<I; iluo/ldly b~/I(ilO oj tho supre//lely imporl<l/ll If'Ubjcct oj II,·,
USA (md the USSR; cmd I,hirdly bcmlUe il is a but'lldlor read b.y //Iillionil oj l~r;plt
(Ill o"er the world. UIIJortllllu/~ly u'e (Ire /lut i,~ po....ril"ioll of tJ,e origill(ll €di/io..
but oj (I tm"ilk,lio,. fJrtbli8hed i .. Swilzulancl. Fur thill rWS<JII, lifM8CIYU qlwled by
..." h"d to be tr'l1I"lule,1 back i"to/:;Ilyli"h. 7'I.e p"ye 1l11/llbcrll me"tiofle,l refer to Ihe
cdit-io .. 'i" all r ha mi",
TRE Ot"FICJ.-\L CO~l:IIlS 'IO:S
J OSEPH E. Dll\'ics, the successor of Wil-liam C. Bullitt as US Amba6lludor tothe USSR, left for his post on Decembl'l'
I:', W3G. I mmetIiately beforo his depar-
tllre lac was, according to a. notc in hi'
diary, entrusted by the State Department
with a ISpeciul commis ion to be carried Ollt
toJ'(cthor \\oit.h hilS routine duties as Am-
ba. ~adol'; lae wall tu settle the p1'0IJI(,1I1 of
Itus ian debt, to America,
A, i well known America had tnlllle luans
to th Ru~ ian GO\'ernment before the
Bolsh{n'ist Rc\'olul ion, loans for wh.ich the
Soviets had always refused to accept any
respon~ibility. Thili had contributed towurd
America's refusal to recognize the Sovil,t
GO\'ernment. ""hen Hoosc\'clt n' 'ognized
the, o\'iet t"nion in 1933-for reMons which
we explained in cletail in our IIrticle "USA
antI USSR" (l'\o\'C'moor UI-t:J)-Lit\-inov
promised in retul'll for this rccogllit.ion to
satit,\fv the claim:; of American citizens IIIltI
the Ds Government on the Soviet Un101l.
A "g ntlemeu' - ll.grt.>eJUent" eOJltuiuing a.
I>nsic nrmngelTl('nt. WIlS signed by Lit\'inov
and J{uosevclt. As far as we know, the
text of this I·gentlemen·s I1gl"UolllC'nt" hilS
nc\'('r I1l'('Il publishl'd, Ilnd Davies !llso di -
crectly omits IIny mention of its details in
his Look in orlil'r to tImw 11.8 little attention
u po'sible to t his em haITl1ssing mattt'r.
Howl'vcr, at thc t.il1lc of DaviCl:!'t\ uepllJ'turc
for i\10 ·cow, the US Government took the
stand that the 'o\-iel bad not lived up to
the ol>ligatiou t.h'y had assumed under
this agreement. Hence complaints about
thl' attitude' of the So\-icts in tbe debts
qllest iOIl, and remarks about the great dis-
appoint.ment thil:! attitude had proved to
H 0 'ev It, played lin im portant part iu
Da\'ies's eom'ersations with the variou' rop-
resentatiYCIl of t·be So\'iet GO\'ernment in
Moscow.
A year aUlI a half later, when Davies was
transferred to Brussels and was preparing
for his departure, he bad not progressed a
single step in this whole matter, It Wll8 onl)"
his farewe-U visit to the Kremlin which
seemed t,o bring a change for the botter.
Davies describes bow Stalin himself lUad
certain proposa.6 M to how this matter was
to be cleared up. Davics took these pro"
posals in the form of a writt n memomnduDl
on his trip to America. Although Ill' WII
no longer Ambassador to tIl(' Soviet l"nion,
be was commissionetl by tbe State .Depart-
mcnt to continue working on this mattcr.
The sulJje-ct graduaUy disappears fronl th
pagl's of ])u\'ie-s's book. The In·t ocelli"ion
on which it is mentionl'o is in his letter 10
the Stato Department of January 17, Ill:!!J,
from which it is quite nppal'Cnt that by that
dnte no settlement had been arrin~d at \'ct.
From tho fnet that thi enti.re compleX' of
(lucstions dCH';; not reappe-ar again in the
book, it is to b(' a....;sumeu that the probl UI
had nul, been soh'cd by 0 I.ober 2~, l!J4-I-
the date of the IIlst entry. Later it wai', of
cour 'e, ovcr'huuowed by the far gl'l'llt er
debt problem uf the Lcnu-Lease suppl.ie-.
••• ":-00 TJU: CO:-;FIIH::-OTIAL 0:-;),;
In guing t.hrough the plelltiful rnal,( rial
contained in the book concerning Du\'i's',-
officilL! main l.n...k, we lLlTi\'e at the 'on-
dll&Ol1 that he was IInable to ttl IIIf'
debts problem either during his tlOlC in
~loscow or later. How. then, is il pO'sihll'
t.hat snch immense credit, for the building
up of Aml'rican-So\'iet I'eln tions is ll.;'cri he-d
to Dn\'il's? ~il1cc his <Jehi \'('Illcnt un' n It
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to be found in t he field of hi' official com-
_ion, they must be sought in tbe carrying
GUt of confidential tasks not acknowledged
ill bis book and dealing with the political
iDIt.ead of the ('conomic sector.
We were not pre~nt whl'n Da\'ies, before
~&\'ing for Moscow, paid his farewell call
in the Oval Boom on th(' !tf'('ond floor of the
White House. Hence we submit it purely
II a hypothesis that Roosevelt said some·
thing to the following ('ffect to Da"ies on
&his occasion :
"Look her(' Joe. There are three dan·
proU8 nations: Germany, Russia, and Ja-
pan. It would he disastrous if these three
mould ever get together. Jt is your job to
lee to it that they don't. Do your utmost
to get Russia o\"t~r on our side. Since war
is inevit,ablc, t he best, t.!ling would be for
tbe Nazis ami thl· Soviets to liiU each other
off. Then wo could stl:'l' in and take care
of what's left."
We repeat: tbis is only a hypothesis, but
.. hypothesis su b. 11ll1tiateO by all t he political
remarks contllined in Davies's book. Davies's
hatfl..'<f for Germany p<'I'IlH>U tes t,he whole
book. On e\'ery few pages there ure attacks
on Germany, ('\'en when they have nothing
to do with the subject. As for Japan, he
has less to say; but, it is clear that he feel!!
limilarly ab~ut this country. The pos·
libility of an understanding between Berlin
and Moseow weig-hs on Davies't! mind like a
nightmare. Kuturally, he only touches upon
this question \'ery carefully. But it reo
appears time tlI1d again:
It requirCH IlUrtily any cxplannl ion LIlQt 8 com·
birmlion of U... rlllull scienliHc 1\11<1 iutluHtrial rnet,h.
odM. Gorml\u lul('nL for orgnnizl\1 ion Ilnd dis·
cipline. with I ho ,,"cnlth of hUlnan and nalur,,!
rtlIlUurces of HIlA-;lI \~ould hll\"(' U grcl't influenco
011 Europe llnd lhe ,,"orin (1'.320).
When this understanding was actuaLJy
arrived at ill Au,gust JU3U, Davies ca.llcd it
a "r1isastroui' l'ullllllity" (\I.:30{)); Ilnd when
finally the war hroke out bc-l ween Germany
and the SO\'iet ("/lioll. he 'pukt' of thi;; event
&.'1 a ··true gift of (.od" (p_37~).
!'AHT:-iEH LITn:-iUY
In his effort~ to bri.n!! auout un American·
Soviet under tanding, ~D vit's WII aided by
the fa t that hi, viet part/lf'r in the dent
negotiation". For ign Commi "ar Lit\·inov.
F'inkeLc:tein, was ju·t a' fanatical an enemy
of Hitler us he was. On ,'ies tells us of
numerous cOIIYf'rsutions he had with Lit.
vinov; 8<l 00 I a~ politic-al question were
touched upon, these com'ersation all took
on 8n anti-Hitler note. Lit.\'inov knew
exact.ly how Roosevelt f<~lt on t.his point.
In bis vl'ry first cOII\'crsation with Davies.
Lit.vinov (I) called Roosevelt, a ;. \'ery great
man"; (2) hinted that America and .Japan
might find themS<'lvcs in conflict; and (3)
attacked Hitler and gave vent to hit! an-
noyance over j<~ngland'll and -"'mnet"s weak
attitude toward Germany (p.-l4). Subject.!"
similar to these reappeared later in c"E'ry
conversation between these two men. The
bett.er they got to know each other, the
more openly did LitvinoY s)JCllk. He ('\'('11
went so far as to intf>rft>re in questions of
American domestic politics by declaring
himseU to be "very worried" over the neu-
trality legi!'lation then being discu !led in
America, which was intended to keep
America out of the immi.nent conflict,s (p.6)).
During the increase in tension brought
about by the Spanish Civil War. Litvinov
encouraged the democracies to threatl'n war
on GermaIn- and ltah' and dccll\recl that
both "wl're~ not yct r~arl.r with t heir war
preparations" (p.83). After the incorpora-
tion of Austria, he d('manded "a change of
governml'nt or at least a cha,nge in th..
policy of Great Britain" toward Gf'rman~'
(p.225). And when Da\'ics asked him to
further Aowricall-So\'iet relation by ending
the Russian Ballet to the' World Exhibition
in New York, he refused this and promptly
made a counterproposal to send the.- male'
choir of tho Red _",-rmy (p.li5).
As regard" what J)a\'ies hil1l!'Clf aid ill
political cOll\·crsation., the book shows far
greater restraint. It. is to b(' found only
indirectl\', for instanr('. in the lettf'r writtf'n
by ])avi'f's to Harry Hopkins, in which h('
urges tho Amerira n (;o\'ernl11('nt "to en,
courage Rou. sia not to yield in her. uPlxwt
of colLecti\"l' security and peat·c-" (p.3:1i).
Stripped of diplomatic phraseology, thi"
is a rcq Ul'st to sti Ifen t hI' Soviet Union'"
back against G('rrunny. Tn a word.
the conH'rsation betw n Litvinov and
Dane' had the main pllrJlOSC of mutuall.\'
reinforcing each otl\l'r' attitlld lowanl
Germany.
WUERE DAnES ('CCEEIJED
How did Da\'ic' fulfill his task of brin~n~
a.bout 8 rappror..J1 /11('1/1 hf't ween the •'ovic
Union amI I he V-'.-\ ~ One \'ear aft'l'r hi"
recall, the foundation for' thc German-
Soviet undl'r -tandinlZ had bren laid: Lit\'ino\'
had Ut'en tirl'd and n:plal'c-d b~' ~Inloto\".
THE x..~th CE~TURY
who soon after concluded the pact with
Kibbentrop. Had Davies published his book
at tha.t time, he would have had to call it
"Failure of a Mission." But he did not
publish it until the autumn of H)41, when
t.he nightmare had pa..<;sed and when Ger-
lIIanv and the Soviet Union were at war
'with' each other. Now Davi.e8 could be put
forward ati the great man who had prepared
the field for tbe friendship between Moscow
and Washington.
E\'er fiince diplomats have existed, it has
hf't'n a moot point wht'th(>r decisions in the
sphere of foreign politics are attributable to
these diplomats or wht'thcr they are the
resldt of objective forct's. Many important
trends IIU.\"c been the work of great diplo-
mat8; we need only think of the role of
TallevrnJl(I in \"icnnll. 01' of Bismarck in
I'arill: But just as mll ny trends arose
without tbem. To what extent can it be
attributed to Da.\"ies that the Soviet Union
finds it·st>lf today in the same camp as the
American ~ According toO the text of the
book. to nonc whatever. .For, according to
the book. he did not onclude any agree-
ments of polit.icnl significance with Litvinov;
he only inveighed ag!linst Germany. In
actual f,lct, however, his conversations with
Litvino\' probably went much further,
Thill is the only explanation for the fa.ct
that he is being xo lionized in America
at pre:if'nt, although he hud Imrdly a.ny
Yiflible l"\Iccesses to "how during his period
of office ('xccpt for It trivle agreement the
{"lfect. of which, moreover, did not come up
t.o expectations. The truth is tbat every-
thing, inclllcling his f!lihue in the question
of debts, is of minor consideration in com-
pari:;on to the fact tha.t, together with
Litvu.lo\', he worked out the main principles
of common American·Soviet policy. In his
final report to the State Department, Davies
insisted that foreign-polit.ical friendship with
the Soyiet Union was of far greater im-
portance than the exi"ting differences:
When in IU:l5 tho Soviot Co\'ommont did not
fllifill its obligations with reaarcl to the agreement
on the uClbl tlCltlmncnt, loans. and the Vomintem.
our (;O\,Orlllll('lIt, was genllilloly pained .•.. At
t hat time it was appropriot.e to insist firmly on
t Ioe carrying Ollt of every single obligation on the
part of tho USSR... , But the 8ituation with
mgarrl t.o Ellropean pC/WI" as well as that in the
P.LCifie Ocenn ami t.he Far E'\st hM chl\l\ged entire·
I~'..•. Today. greater problems 8.re at st..ake, ..•
In my opinion. it woulcll)(' advisable for tloe mission
I,ere to be "arried 011 in us friendly and harmonious
a spirit os evor possible, .. , ~o at.titude must be
adopt.cd whieh gives rise t.) c1i~trust and hostility
<pp.328,3:!!l).
Hence also Davies's acknowledged endeavors
to keep diJIerences between the two 8tat~
as much as possible out of the pre8H (p.273).
Hence also his pressure on the Briti8h
Ambassador to Moscow to cause him to sue
for Moscow's friend8hip (p.250).
It is true that Stalin haa alwa.vs conducted
his own purposeful policy B.nd hM never
hesita.ted to go his own way, as was the
case in 1939 when, by means of his pact
with H.ibbentrop, it led him without
effort to Beasa.rabia, eastern Pola.nd, and the
Baltic states. But the anti-Hitler course
workcd out by Davies and Litvinov was not
affected, and Litvinov needed only to be
fetched back from obscurity at an opportuue
moment for contiJ1Uing it. The significance
of D!wies's book i8 to be found in the very
fact that it elucidates these connecting
threads, and the book will one day be au
important source for the history of diplo-
macy between the two World Wars. But
t.his W/l.S na.turally not the reason for its
publication; the reason is t.o be found else-
where.
THE PURPOSE OF TffE BOOK
We do not know exactly when the Ameri-
can edition was published, Apparently the
plan to publish the book arose in the Rutumn
of 1941, when the Soviet Union WM at WR·r
with Germany and thus had automatically
joined the ca.mp of the Anglo-Americam;.
At tbat time, there were two things R,oosewlt
was aiming at: (1) to win over the strongly
anti-Bolshevist public opinion of America.
to co-operation with Moscow; and (2) to
increase America's confidence in the Soviet
fightiJlg power. For both these aims, the
book was eminently suited. By exploiting
the American's faith in "documents," it
skillfully seeks to invalidate all the reasons
for the American's dislike for the Soviet
Union.
(1) In the vexatious debts question,
DavieR pretendR that" through Stalin's per-
sonal intercession before his own departure.
everything had been settled. As we have
seen, this was not the ca,'>e.
(2) He tries to count-er the Ameriean's
repulsion toward t,he atheism in the USSR
by little anecdotes; he narrates, for example,
that there are many icons hanging in the
room of Kalinin's mother and that Kalinin
had said that the icons did not bother him
and that he had nothing against them (p.I~4).
Davies's favorite method of indirectly de-
fending the religious policy of the Bolsheviks
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eonsists of rt'p<'Att'<1 attacks agl\inllt the
poUC)' of tht' National-Socialist Government
toward t,he Chul'clL
(3) To do RWI1.Y with till' difllikl' of the
American Lipper das.'lCs of BolflheviAIU as an
economic sydtelll. Davies d<-elares that there
is no such thing. for "the Communist prin-
ciple hilS lJf'Cn ablludoned ill faet lIud in
troth" (p.73).
(4) 1'\aturnlly very little iB said in the
book about t,hl' t'omintern. The first time
be mentiulI!I the word, he interpretll it ill l\
footnote lUi ; 'thl' organizatiun uf thl' Com-
munist Party of which it is claimed that it
lIupports and dil'Cutll the C'ommunillt, llIachillll-
tions ... in non· Russian l'OImt,riell" (p.56).
Davies lilieS the skeptical "it is claimed,"
alt,hough his own GO\'&nment had his pred-
fCeSSOr hand nUmf'rOU8 notE'S to the 80vi('t~
which showed t,hat there was plenty of proof
of the exiswrlC'e of thef'e acti,-ities.
(;j) Stalin'", 1'IIrgetl of 11I·omim·llt Soviet
leade!':; hnd IIturtf'd a wa \'e of ditltl'llst uf
the Soviet Ullioll ill AllIl'ricll. JJlII'ing
Dtwil's's tt'rm of office, the Hudek I\nd
BLikharin trials llil welJ us the .>xe('ution of
the gl'IWI'UI." lind the liquidation uf ttms of
thOLlSlllld!l of otl1l'1' political and military
I('aders took placl" In or'der to mllke tlll'8e
I.'\·cnts palat able to the Anlt'riclUl pu Llic.
Davit>s had lin imipil'll.t,ion: he called all thuse
who were liquidl~Led "fifth ('olullllliI:!L:;" IIml
pruised Stalin for having d£'strovl.'d the
j'tift,h colunlll" in the Soviet tInio;, Lv his
purge.", It goe" without saying thllt" l;t the
time of t hl' trial", 110 one e\'ell thought uf
the "fifth ('ulIlIllll"; and, in onll'r to hilI'-
monizc thl' l'l'ports writt('n at thllt time
with this n.,w theory. D8.\·;es would have
had tu r.'\Hill' them ent,irely. Hl' prl'fcrn·d
another nwthod. In the middlt·, of his
book (pp.:?O!.l-:?('i) there is n chapt,er' ('ntitl('c1
"The Fifth ('011111111 ill H,ussia" ",riltl'n fOllr
year;; aflpr the triols. fn it hc ele"crib£'s
how. in the summer of 1941 he slIddl'nh'
rl.'nlized thC' tnl£' ."ignificanee ~f thl' purg('~.
fly 1ll('l\IIS of thi" cxplanation, IIn"il's IllAkes
out Stalin's Ilnnihilation of hill pc liticnl
rivals to han' 1/1'('11 11 patriotic d(,l'd.
(Ii) Davi""!1 hook WliS intNulc'd to h£'lp
wipp out, till' bitt,'r nH>mory of ~t.lIlin's pact
wit,h Hitler ulld :-itnlin'" ll<'lioll'l'l in Ell:itarn
Europe in IH:m 411. 1"01' thi8 pmI'm,.., the
book contaill" matt'I'iul reaching up tn the
('luI of Oct<,L.'r 1!1-l1, fnl' b<'\'OIHI I>a\'if's's
lIct un I tprm of otli('('. Th is ;na bl"!1 Du \' if'8
to enI8r~<, upon his thE'si." that th£' SoviC'ts
had beell drin'n tu tht>ir pa£'t with HitlC'r
9--
•• ,>
bv till" "rN\etionariC's in England and
Fra 11£'(' ."
(i) .For years p<'o1'le in .-\nwrica had beel/
accustomed t,o IIp<:ak of Natiol\ld-~ocialiI4
Germany and Bolsbc\'ist Russil\ ill the same
t.erms, e.p<.'CiaLly in the years In:}H to Hiott.
Now 811ddenly the two had to 1><' s('paratcd
and one to be describt><.l as ('\'il and the
other as good. Da\-ies attempts to do thi:i
with the 8taggering argument that. Com-
llluuislll is fur closer to Chri!ltinnitv thun
National·Socialism. In proof of thi~ thesis
he st,atel:!: "The Communi!'lt iell'lIl ill thut
the state should disapp<·ar.... Tho Na-
tional·Socialist ideal is the complete opposite
-t,he stato Ill! the IHll'reme virt,lIl' in itllClf"
(p,:J77). In thiil connection it is to be said
thnt ill tht· So\'i('f, Cnion the Iltute hns long
~n II .. thing in itilelf," not only in practice
but al"o in theor~·. 88 is pronl<.! by un llJ1iclo
on tht' Sovit·t !'ltate by \'yshil\l:lky in the
Pronia of J Line ]6, 1944.
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The s('cond importaut aim of the hook,
we ha \'e /:laid. wus to enhllnce America'II
faith ill the fighting power of the l'SSR.
which Wllll \'ery necC!:l8ury at Il t inl(' whell
the Red Army had 1><.'('11 thrown baek
thou/:landl:l of kilometers. Hftllec 1lI11ll('rou,;
reports by t.he Ambassador df'lIlillg with
q L1estionl! pertaining to oeonoll] il'lI, ('spl-'CiaLly
I\rllllLlIH'nts, ha\'e been includf'd in t,he book,
As the Am bassador mllde a 111111I her l,f l'X-
tenlli\'e jOlll'lw."s and obst'r\'(·d t hillgll with
the cyt!,; of all ex p('rienced ('l'onuln;,;t, t.hes~
reports ('ontlLill II lot of IlIllterial which,
ult hoUg!l it hn,; m("l.IIlwmk b('I'nllW \lbsol(~t<"
bf'ars important witness t-o thl' I'/uly start
of Soviet reUrIlHIIIJ('nts, el:lpecially as' it was
publi!lhf·d by a fri£'nd of the i'iovi,>t Ullion.
As carly ll." Jilly I, IH3i, 1>II\'ie,; writes that,
t,he So"i{·t8 Wfll't' "pending h"icl' a!'l mll.. l. 011
armllllll'lItl:l a8 England und Vrancl' pill.
together (1'.1 :?i). On "(>\'('1'1I1 O\'l'llsion" he
l"pcakl'l of "fl'\'erish war prepal'Hl ion,,"; and
afkr hill \'i"it to the tractor fllt·ttJI'\' in Rost,()\'
on thl' DOli, the largest of its kiwi ill the
r~RR, h... Illllde thl' fuUowing 1'lItl'}' :
\rllen \\'IJ left 1110 workR. In\, lIll"tlkilll II. h·i~orR.
tile group of r"\lIlt'l'i,·.m] jUll;"n .. li~tR. agn,..d Ihal
tile ftl('lol'~' waR I",jllg (umed into a 1'111 Il I for til.,
mlln"fnl'lurl' of .'nl"rpilllll' Ir"t"l~ fnr IIII'll" "",ks
(p.HtI).
Dlwiell WIIS hardly jllstifi('d in r('prt>sclltillg
his ('onclullionR IIbollt the IlrmnllH'lIt I:ltrellgth
of the ll~~R Ill' entin·ly nl'W di"c'o\'£'rie" of
his own, Hill rl'l'orts ~n SO\'il,t, ('l'onomict!
did not cOllt,lIill mild, mort> than whllt, wn.~
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l.11'illg reported at that tune by all halfway
diieient emba""ies and wha.t such :serious
AllIerican students of the USSR as Harold
!Jenny anu Demaree Bess W('fe continually
pu blishulg in Tile Sew Yorl: 'l'ime.s and the
('hristia./1 .science Jlonitor. The novelty lay,
nut in that Amcrica hea,rd of these things,
hut ill the fad that Davies, with his close
connections with nUlllerous political and
cconomic leauers of the USA, possessed a far
greuter resonance for such ide~ in Washing-
ton's leuding circles tlHl.1l bis prcdecessor or
the prc::!s.
DA"LES AN D HIS HOOK
We hu\'e already briefly charadcrized
Ambassador Davies in our article of Novem-
ber IU-l:3. The only new fact we learncd
about him fwm his book is that once before,
in 1913, he was considereu by Woodrow
Wilson for the po::!t of Ambassador to Russia
(p. xiii), in other words, that he is an old-
brner in the Democratic Party. His reports
and letters show that he is a typical success·
ful Anll:wican businessman and millionaire
anu that he has a very good opinion of
himself amI his a.bility. The ladies' luncheon
to which his wife was invitt.-d by }lrs. Molo-
tov itS .. the til'st ladies' luncheon in the
~oviet Inion"; his farewell on his departure
from Moscow is "the biggest farewell." It
I;t.rikcs one IlS :slightly curious in ll. highly
pulitical ducumentary work published with
of1:ieial support when one finds a letter
wl'itton by Davies to his daughter and
dc::!cribulg the farewell speech made by
Litvillov in his honor to contain the follow-
ing "inscrt.ed I'emark" by Mrs. Davies:
Uaud.,· t1oeSII'L day dO, nuL it was relllly " wonder.
fill Inllrk of hOllor for YOllr brilli,mt father Ilnd
t he work he IlIl~ done here. You woultl have
almost burst with (wide-like me (p.279).
Davies waR in the Soviet Union between
,January 18, 1\)3i, lI.nd June 10,1938, actual-
ly off and on altog~ther only twelve months.
Rut the five hundred pages of his book
contain material cO\'ering five years-from
),[ovember W, 1936, t,o October 28, 1941-
official reports tu the State Dcpartment,
personal letters, ent ries into two different
diaries, footnotes, and explanatory addi·
tions. All this not \'ery homogeneous rna-
lot'rial has bc.'Cn most skilUully composed and
Illltkes absorbing reauing. Howe\'er, it is
nccessa,ry to make certarn resen'ations to-
ward the contents of a book written in war
l.ime about an aUy for whom goodwill is to
be created. Even if we assume that the
official reports are authentic and untam-
pered with-a.lthough one cannot help re-
marking how smoothly they rUll and that
there arc no dots to indicat,e omissions
which must have been unavoidable-we
must bear in mind that only a very small
and earefu.l sdection of these reports was
included in the book. The numbering of
the docu.ments shows that, during his term
of office ill Moscow, Da\'ies wrote no less
than 1,348 reports to the State Department
alone. Yet only some 5U reports are re-
produced. With a selection such as that,
almost anything can be pro,cd.
The two diaries are not entirely con·
vinculg. Many quotations from them give
the impression of having been entered after-
wards in order to link up the actual docu-
ments in the desireu manner. Examples of
this are the lllany attacks ou Germany,
which have nothing to do with the subject.
It is rather hard to imagine t,hat the Ameri-
Ciln Am bassa.rlor in Moscow spent his free
time filling his diary with attacks ago,inst a
government with which he had nothing
whatever to do. One entry occupying a full
page is devoted to Roosevelt's famous
Quarantine Speech. Why should the Am-
bassador have bothered to copy into his
diary a speech his Presiuent bad made in
Chicago? It had been reprinted in millions
of newspapers and was at his disposal any
time he needed it. Hence its place is bardly
in the diary of an ambassador but certainly
in a book of political propaga.nda. Aud
finally, a father, even so proud a father as
Davies, would hardly write about his own
daughter in his priva.te diary:
She speaks quite good Russian, has grarluated
from Vassar 1I,nd is attending Icdurcd aL lhe Mos·
cow Universit~, (p.IOI).
Whoever wa,') in charge of editing the book
has done a good job. The book contains
only a few factual errors. (Davies calls the
tune of the International-which was com·
poscd by a Frenchman-typically Russian;
be speaks of the AI·menian ~Iikoyan as a
Georgian and calls the German Military
Attache von Koest,rich instead of Koestru]g.)
Although the book contains nothing new
for those who closely follow the trends and
problems in the So\riet Union, it is interest-
ing by reason of the vi\'iuncss of its descrip-
tions. It al,>o t,hrows some new light on
questions affecting the So\-iet Union only
indirectly. When, for example, in October
1939 the Soviet ~iinister in Belgium sub-
mitted to Davies, who was then .-\rnbassarlor
to Brussels, the questioll of mediating peace
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011 . ept£mber 1, 1944. all Ihe tllenlers ill Germany closed Iheir tloor.9 in ac-
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It was a bold st('p to turn again to those
epic subjectll to whieh we owe some of our
greatf'>;t, l11u>;tf1rpieces. ~evertheless in this
field of dm-matic art four outstanding aehieve-
menU! were recorded in recent months:
In Helena, Hermann Rossmann doe>; not
desLroy the Illyst,cry shrouding the immortal
figllro of Helen of Troy; she a ppear<t now a:.l
the sensuous beauty, now itS the cool philos-
opher. The drama might more fitly have
been entitled "Hector," as Hector i the
central porsonality and perhaps the finest
ROStlmann has created. Of aU the heroes of
the Trojan War, Rector alone remains in·
sensible t.o Helen's beauty, the l'anse of the
then 9·year-old conflict; he only sees
humiliation in the suffering engendered by It
woman's charms. His one !lim is t.o put
an end to it. And so he lean's wife and
child to decide the issue in single combat
created great opportunities for the modern
playwright., opportunities which, as the
wealth and diversity of new plays show, he
was not ISlow to seize.
in America. The husband of a woman who
b.v birth and first marriage belongs to the
Hutton-Post-Woolwort.h dan with its ad-
mitted taxable property of Hi;'} million
American dollars is not likely to be Hympu..
thetie to Boisheyism; tlO whatever he says
in faYOI' of the So\-iets must be truc: t,his is
the way the American mind is SlIpPosf'd to
work. No wonder Lib'illov pllblicl~' ga\'e
vent to his enthusiusm abont the book.
The Soviet·propagandistic nature of the
book is amazingly expressed by the cover
design of the book, whieh i::! reproduced at
the head of this article. The hammer-and·
sickle flag waves above a curious version of
the Stars and Stripes.
"::\IlSSlO~ TO :11108('0"""
1Ietween r;ermany amI the \Vestern powers,
Davies immediately gave him a whoUy
aegative reply, declaring that t,he US Govern-
lIIent "did not interfere in Ellropf'an
'iIJa irs, "
Seen as a wllol(', the book s(;'n-es the
Soviet cause mure than t,he American one,
!rhe favorable l"l'pOl'ts on the Soviet Union
by f[\J" outweigh the critical one:.l. Davies
teems to believe that he can counterbalance
this impression by frequently emphasizing
his s.vmpathies for the capitalist, syst('m and
by his claim that Bolshevism has no longer
anything to do with Communism. But in
pite of this, we feel that the book may be
regarded as it pacemaker of BoL"hevist ideas
T!iE long queues formillg in front ofthe booking offices houri; before theyopened, a.nd the fad that a curtain
nover ro.~f' OXC'Apt on a packcd bouse,
'JX'~tk more e10qucntly tha.n statistics of the
nat.ion-wide popula.rity of drama,tic art. in
war·time Germany. More so than in t.imes
of peaCt', the war-timo audience of the
G('rman theater was the German people-
men amI women from all walks of lifc, many
ill uuiform ami many still band;.tgecl, And
liS it is aftN a II the audience whieh deter-
minc:; the program, la..,t sl~ason':'t program
rcflt'cts the attitudo and interests of the
(.;crman nation in the fifth year of the war.
As in previom, ~'eitrS, the program includNI
til(' [If'rfornlluwc uf numerous dl'Umatic works
1)\' Goethe, Schiller, KlciRt" nnd other
riassical German authors: But. apart from
these, last season witnesserl what was per·
hapll (\ record number of premif:re.s, The
(;('rman public today lin's intonflely in the
prt·sent. anr! cQnseq uently demand::! of the
stage t,he presentat.ion of dramatic subjects
-llot war su bjects only, but eyer}' SIl bject
-in terms of the prcsent. This demand has
